A wallet delegated 87,238.5461 FORTH voting power to a proposing address on September 14, which immediately submitted Proposal 54 requesting a transfer of 2.5 million USDC from Ampleforth’s treasury. Approximately 14 minutes later, the delegating wallet withdrew its voting power and canceled the proposal before voting opened, according to onchain records reviewed by CryptoSlate.
The requested amount represented 98.5% of Ampleforth’s displayed USDC balance and 70.2% of the protocol’s total marked treasury value of $3.56 million as of September 15, 2026. Tally records show zero votes were cast on Proposal 54, and the cancellation block preceded the scheduled voting-start block. No transfer executed.
Governance Submission Gate
Ampleforth’s governance documentation outlines a progression through discussion, formal proposal development, targeted discussion, optional offchain signaling, and technical work before a final binding onchain vote. The deployed contract’s submission gate turns on voting power, meaning any wallet meeting the delegation threshold can initiate a proposal.
Proposal 54 documentation stated: “The proposal called the tool completed, independent and unofficial, and its sole executable action directed the USDC to proposing wallet 0x730C…dd82.” The proposal author presented the payment as a retrospective grant for Observatory for SPOT, a public, open-source analytics interface.
Delegation and Cancellation
Address 0x38cA…24D8 delegated 87,238.5461 FORTH voting power to the proposing wallet approximately 19 minutes before the proposal-creation transaction. The same address then transferred 87,238.5461 FORTH away and called cancel(54) roughly 14 minutes after delegation, according to onchain records.
Ampleforth’s governance system relies on a prior-block voting power threshold rule, which prevented the proposal from reaching a voting window. The proposal was canceled on-chain before votes could be cast.
Characterizations and Record
GoPlus Security characterized the proposal as an attack. CryptoSlate, however, notes the verified record shows a canceled proposal with zero treasury loss and no executed exploit. The identity of the delegating address 0x38cA…24D8 and the proposing wallet’s controller remain unidentified in onchain records and cited proposal documentation. The proposal author disclosed address 0x38cA…24D8 among addresses the grantee might use to vote or that might delegate voting power to it, but control of that address has not been established.
